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Concerning the invasion of Ukraine: some brief observations.
António Rebelo de Sousa
Economist
There are, as is only natural, many theories regarding the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
Nevertheless, objective analysis requires that we recognise some evidence. The first is that Russia has undeniably flouted international law. This is undeniable, even for the most conniving analyst of Russian strategy. The second has to do with the fact that there is no truth to the argument that Russia has historical reasons, resulting from NATO's «strategy of encirclement» in relation to the country, until now led by Putin, suggesting that the essence of the whole problem has to do with the territorial security of that country, potentially threatened by the West.
Now, even if there had not been a «NATO advance» towards countries of former Eastern Europe, the Russians would always believe, under the leadership of an autocrat like Putin, that the spread of democratic regimes to the East would constitute a threat to the survival of a dictatorial regime in Russia: there would be, in its neighbourhood, a number of democratic parties that would criticise the «Russian internal order», that would support the opponents existing in that country, and this would be enough for an autocratic regime to consider that it was confronted with a national security problem.
Putin knows very well that NATO would never take the initiative to attack Russia by force, but he also knows very well that the European democratic parties, including those in Eastern Europe, will always support the opposition to a dictatorial Russian regime, seeking to contribute to a possible further subversion of the regime led by Putin.What Putin truly fears is not the military attack by NATO, but rather the «democratic subversion» that might come from Europe.
The third observation concerns the fact that Russia has long exercised an imperial power of a «territorial" rather than «networked» nature, with the limitations that this implies.For Putin it is not enough to have economic, ethnic and cultural influence in a region. It is also necessary to 'stomp on the territory' with the 'boots' of your own army and to appoint a governor-general.
The fourth observation has to do with a certain «flight forward» momentum in the current «Russian Empire». And this trend has reached proportions that go far beyond the strategies outlined by Brezhnev or even by Stalin. And this is something new and worrying.
The fifth point – and this is inescapable – is that the West can never negotiate that it will not try to support democratic regimes in Eastern Europe, as well as movements in favour of human rights in Russia itself, even if this is considered an attack on national security by the Muscovite nomenclature. This will always be non-negotiable. If, for Mr Putin's Russia to consider itself secure from the West, the West itself must renounce the defence of democracy in Eastern Europe and Russia, then the existence of NATO is not the issue.
The danger for Putin is not called NATO.
The danger for Putin is called DEMOCRACY.
And this is the incontrovertible truth that some wish to disguise.
Nothing more, nothing less...
Nevertheless, objective analysis requires that we recognise some evidence. The first is that Russia has undeniably flouted international law. This is undeniable, even for the most conniving analyst of Russian strategy. The second has to do with the fact that there is no truth to the argument that Russia has historical reasons, resulting from NATO's «strategy of encirclement» in relation to the country, until now led by Putin, suggesting that the essence of the whole problem has to do with the territorial security of that country, potentially threatened by the West.
Now, even if there had not been a «NATO advance» towards countries of former Eastern Europe, the Russians would always believe, under the leadership of an autocrat like Putin, that the spread of democratic regimes to the East would constitute a threat to the survival of a dictatorial regime in Russia: there would be, in its neighbourhood, a number of democratic parties that would criticise the «Russian internal order», that would support the opponents existing in that country, and this would be enough for an autocratic regime to consider that it was confronted with a national security problem.
Putin knows very well that NATO would never take the initiative to attack Russia by force, but he also knows very well that the European democratic parties, including those in Eastern Europe, will always support the opposition to a dictatorial Russian regime, seeking to contribute to a possible further subversion of the regime led by Putin.What Putin truly fears is not the military attack by NATO, but rather the «democratic subversion» that might come from Europe.
The third observation concerns the fact that Russia has long exercised an imperial power of a «territorial" rather than «networked» nature, with the limitations that this implies.For Putin it is not enough to have economic, ethnic and cultural influence in a region. It is also necessary to 'stomp on the territory' with the 'boots' of your own army and to appoint a governor-general.
The fourth observation has to do with a certain «flight forward» momentum in the current «Russian Empire». And this trend has reached proportions that go far beyond the strategies outlined by Brezhnev or even by Stalin. And this is something new and worrying.
The fifth point – and this is inescapable – is that the West can never negotiate that it will not try to support democratic regimes in Eastern Europe, as well as movements in favour of human rights in Russia itself, even if this is considered an attack on national security by the Muscovite nomenclature. This will always be non-negotiable. If, for Mr Putin's Russia to consider itself secure from the West, the West itself must renounce the defence of democracy in Eastern Europe and Russia, then the existence of NATO is not the issue.
The danger for Putin is not called NATO.
The danger for Putin is called DEMOCRACY.
And this is the incontrovertible truth that some wish to disguise.
Nothing more, nothing less...
